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Pignataro: Copyright Law and the Internet

COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE INTERNET:
THE NEW GENERATION OF
LEGAL BATTLES IN THE COURTS
Catherine Pignataro'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internet has brought a unique challenge to the courts
in applying existing copyright law, and to the legislature which
has been forced to create new law in response to these challenges.
As a result of the creation of the Internet, new laws must be
enacted in order to keep up with the ever-changing world of
copyright law as new developments in technology occur. This
article discusses existing copyright law and the challenges that the
legislature and courts have faced in applying such law to issues
involving the Internet. Further, this article discusses the different
types of copyright infringement and the problems that have arisen
in applying these causes of action to cases involving the Internet.
A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster2 and its progeny, which present
some of the most difficult issues to come to the court since the
development of the Internet, are central to this discussion. This
article also discusses why certain aspects of existing copyright
law are contrary to the important public policy of promoting the
development of technological advances. In conclusion, this article
suggests an expansion of the current law regarding copyright.
II.

THE INTERNET

"The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but
rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller
'J.D. Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, 2002. This article
won Second Prize in the 2002 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at Touro
Law Center, a competition sponsored by ASCAP. The author wishes to thank
Professor Rena Seplowitz for her guidance in writing this article. In addition,
the author wishes to thank Dawn Kelly of the Touro Law Review for her
editing assistance.
2 2000 WL 1009483 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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groups of linked computer networks.
The Internet was
originally designed by the government as an alternative form of
communication, sophisticated enough to continue operation
during a variety of situations, including war.4 The Internet was
able to withstand such situations because it was "capable of
rapidly transmitting communications without direct human
involvement or control and with the automatic ability to re-route
communications if one or more individual links were damaged or
otherwise unavailable." 5
Messages sent over the Internet are broken down into
many parts called packets. 6 If one route to a particular destination
is blocked or overloaded, a single packet may take a different
route, ultimately reaching the same destination. At the
destination, the packets are reassembled by the receiving
computer to form the message. 7 This process takes place in a
matter of seconds, making the Internet a "resilient nationwide
and ultimately global communications medium. " 8 In 1991, the
government allowed the commercialization of the Internet. 9 This
commercialization and international consumer use resulted in the
Internet we know today.' 0
The Internet raises a variety of new legal issues for the
courts to resolve. In addition, the Internet has created many new
business opportunities. New varieties of businesses, such as
online magazines, shopping and advertising are products of the
Internet. Information is placed on the Internet by authors or third
parties for others to freely view for a specific purpose. Today's
technology creates problems because, in addition to viewing this
information openly, people may also copy it "freely." Although
Internet users may be able to use what they see on the Internet,
their use of the material may be contrary to another's right or
3 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
4

Id. at 831.

5 Id.
6
id.
7

1d.
8 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
9 JONATHAN EZOR, CLICKING THROUGH 8
10Id.

(Bloomberg Press 2000).
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ownership interest. Specifically, this use may interfere with
another party's copyright in the material. Whether the material is

music, poetry or a picture, they were created by someone who
may or may not be aware of their availability on the Internet.
That creator has a copyright interest in his work and may exclude
others from using that work." Copyright law was enacted to stop

unauthorized use and protect the rights of authors. 12
III.

COPYRIGHT LAW

The Copyright Act of 197613 protects all original works,
both literary and artistic, published and unpublished, which are
"fixed in a tangible medium of expression."' 4 The Act lists
specific categories of protected works, including literature,
music, drama, motion pictures and architecture.1 5 Specific
exclusive rights to the work are given to the author.16 These
exclusive rights are subject to certain limitations' 7 and last only
for a specified period of time.' 8 Federal law governs the majority

1

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).

12

Id. § 102.

Pub. L. No. 94-553 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq
(2000)).
14 Id. §§ 102,
104.
's Id. § 102(a).
16
Id. § 106.
7 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122. Statutory limitations on exclusive rights are
"

listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107. These linitations are what the statute calls "Fair
Use," meaning the listed uses do not violate the owner's copyright. Fair use
includes scholarship, news reporting, and teaching. The statute also provides
factors used to determine whether a specific use may be labeled by a court as
fair use. Sections 108-122 discuss specific types of uses and the limitations on
exclusive copyright ownership those uses address. Id. §§ 108-122.
"s See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305. The length of copyright protection will
depend on factors such as whether it was a joint work, whether the author is
alive, whether the author is anonymous and whether it was a work for hire.
Id.
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of copyright law as the Copyright Act preempts the application of
state law in many areas. 19
Under the Copyright Act, the owner of a copyright has
"the exclusive rights to do or to authorize..." (1) reproduction of
the copyrighted work; (2) preparation of derivative work; (3)
distribution of copies of the work; (4) display the work; (5) to
display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) to perform a
copyrighted sound recording publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission. 20 When a person performs any of these acts without
the permission of the copyright holder, she is infringing upon the
copyright holder's right and will be liable to the copyright holder.
Copyright holders have many remedies available to them,
including injunctions, 2' impounding and/or destruction of all
infringing articles (such as copies made),22 damages, profits or
statutory damages, 23 as well as the possibility of full costs, which

may include reasonable attorney's fees.24 Criminal penalties are
also available under section 506.25
There are different categories of copyright infringement.
Direct copyright infringement occurs when a person, without the
permission of the owner of a copyright, violates any of the six
exclusive rights listed in the Copyright Act. 26 The plaintiff in a
direct copyright infringement case must prove (1) a violation of
any one of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner listed in
27 Intent is not a
section 106; and (2) ownership of the copyright.
2
requirement to find direct infringement.

'9 17 U.S.C. § 301. State law may cover any aspect of copyright law that is
not within the Act. For example, the Act does not cover "any work not fixed
in20any tangible means of expression." Id. § 301(b)(1).
Id. § 106.
21 Id. § 502(a).
22 Id. § 503(a) and (b).
23 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(d).
24 Id. § 505.
2 5 Id. § 506.
26
Id.§ 106(1) - (6).

27
28

Id. § 501(a) and (b).
Religious Tech. v. Netcom Online Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp.

1361, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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Contributory copyright infringement and vicarious
copyright infringement involve third party responsibility. Most
case law in the area of copyright infringement, especially
involving the Internet, involves contributory and vicarious
infringement. Contributory copyright infringement takes place
when a person, "with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
of another." 29 Vicarious copyright infringement takes place when
a person "has the right and ability to control the infringer's acts
and receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement." 30
As the Internet became increasingly popular, the existing
copyright protection provided by the law was not sufficiently
extensive to cover the formerly unforeseen advances in
technology. To rectify this problem, Congress amended the
Copyright Act in many areas. One of these amendments resulted
in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998. 3'
IV.

THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT

(DMCA)

The most basic Internet copyright infringement scenario
involves an individual Internet user infringing copyrights by
posting or downloading copyrighted material. 32 Rather than
blaming the individual user for the infringement, the party usually
blamed in this type of a case is the Internet Service Provider
(ISP). 33 The reason for shifting the blame from the individual
user, who was actually doing the infringing, to the ISP was that

29 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971).
30 Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
31 Digital Millenium Copyright A, Pub. L. No. 105-304 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of Title 17 U.S.C. and adding § 1201 and
§ 1202).
32 MARK A. LEMLEY et al., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 872 (Aspen

200).

33 Id.
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the ISP was easier to locate and more likely to be able to pay a
judgment.34

Congress passed the DMCA in 1998 to remedy blame
35
shifting to ISPs by providing limited safe harbor provisions.
The safe harbor provisions provide protection for ISPs, which the
Act refers to as Online Service Providers (OSPs), by giving them
limited protection for what is posted on their systems. 36 The
DMCA changed copyright law by (1) adding safe harbor
provisions for Internet service providers; 37 (2) making it illegal to
remove the copyright information contained in copyrighted
works; 38 and (3) making it illegal to circumvent a copyright
protection system put in place to prevent copying. 39

The DMCA's safe harbor provisions4° exempt service
providers who meet the statutory criteria from liability for direct,
vicarious, and contributory copyright infringement. 41 They
protect service providers against having to pay monetary damages
and limit injunctive relief.42 To qualify for this safe harbor
protection, an entity must be considered a service provider under
the statute.
Once an entity is determined to be a service provider,
there are additional conditions that must be satisfied.43 To be

eligible for the limitations on liability provided by the safe harbor
provisions in this statute, the service provider must also show that.
it: "(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs
subscribers... of, a policy that provides for the termination in
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of
the service provider's system or network who are repeat
Id. at 872.
5Id. at 872, 888 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512).

14
36

Id.

3'LEMLEY, supra note 32, at 891 (citing 17 U.S.C. §512).
38 LEMLEY, supra note 32, at 891 (citing 17 U.S.C. §1202).
39 LEMLEY, supra note 32, at 891 (citing 17 U.S.C. §1201).
40 LEMLEY,

supra note 32, at 891 (citing 17 U.S.C. §512 (b)).

41A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136, at *3 (2000)

(citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)).
42

id.

43 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1).
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infringers; and (B) accommodates and does not interfere with
standard technical measures." 44 These requirements are in
addition to the specific safe harbor provisions found in
sections 512 (a), (b), (c) or (d).
An ISP may find safe harbor protection under section
512(a) safe harbor provision if the following five conditions,
referring specifically to the "transmitting, routing, or providing
connections" by the service provider, are met: 45
1. [T]he transmission of the material was initiated by or
at the direction of a person other than the service
provider;
2. the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or
storage is carried out through an automatic technical
process without selection of the material by the service
provider;
3. the service provider does not select the recipients of
the material except as an automatic response to the
request of another person;
4. no copy of the material made by the service provider
in the course of such intermediate or transient storage
is maintained on the system or network in a manner
ordinarily accessible to anyone other than the
anticipated recipients, and no such copy is maintained
on the system or network in a manner ordinarily
accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer
period than is reasonably necessary for the
transmission, routing, or provision of connections; and
5. the material is transmitted through the system or
network without modification of its content.46
An additional safe harbor for service providers is made
available in section 512(d). 47 The conditions that a service
4Id.

§ 512.

2000 WL 573136 at *3 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)).
17 U.S.C. § 512 (a).
47 Id. § 512(d).
45 Napster,
46
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provider must meet for protection under section 512(d) are as
follows:
" (1)(A) does not have actual knowledge that the
material or activity is infringing;
" (B) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not
aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent; or
* (C) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material;
* (2) does not receive a financial benefit directly
attributable to the right and ability to control such
activity; and
* (3) upon notification of claimed infringement
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity .... 48
Finally, section 512(n) was added to assist the courts in
the application of ihe DMCA by stating:
[s]ubsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) describe
separate and distinct functions for purposes of
applying this section. Whether a service provider
qualifies for the limitation on liability in any one of
those subsections shall be based solely on the
criteria in that subsection, and shall not affect a
determination of whether that service provider
qualifies for the limitations on liability under any
other such subsection.49
To clarify, the courts apply the safe harbor provisions
separately, although they may overlap in some areas. 50 The
elements of each must be satisfied entirely for protection under
48 Id.

§ 512(k)(1)(A).

Id. § 512(n) (emphasis added).
so Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *3.
49
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the specific safe harbor. 5 ' The DMCA has played a significant
role in Internet cases by providing some direction to the court for
analyzing the technological intricacies of these cases.
V.

COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET

Nearly everything posted on the Internet is the work of
someone else, a creator, whether it is a symbol, essay, book,
program, song or picture, unless it is in the public domain.5 2 The
average individual Internet user may not be aware of copyright
laws, seeing the Internet as a free supermarket for ideas,
information and other intangible desires. As the Internet evolved
into what we know it as today, copyright law has expanded, as
well as bent, twisted and turned, to protect all the things on the
Internet that may appear "free" to the average Internet user. The
courts and legislature faced and continue to face copyright
53
challenges since commercialization of the Internet.
A.

Direct Copyright Infringement and the Internet

Direct copyright infringement is the most obvious
violation of a copyright owner's rights. In Playboy Enterprises v.
Webbworld,54 the defendant, Webbworld, selected adult-oriented
newsgroups and downloaded pictures from their site. In addition,
they received "news feeds," which are files sent to defendant
from the newsgroups, and downloaded them to Webbworld's
computers. 55 The defendant used a software program to edit the
51

id.

52 Works in the public domain do not receive copyright protection under the
copyright law. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 100-568, sec. 12, 102 Stat. 2853, 2861 (codified at 17 U.S.C. 101 note
(2000)). Also, facts are not copyrightable. See Harper & Row Publishers v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
53 EZOR, supra note 9 at 8. According to the author, the Internet became
commercial in 1991. EZOR, supra note 9 at 8.
54 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
5 Id. at 549.
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images and send them to its server computers.56 Users who paid a
monthly subscription fee to the defendant could then view or
download the images. 57 Defendant obtained mass amounts of
images every day, including many images for which Playboy held
valid copyright registrations. 8 Some of the images sent by the
defendant to its server computers were "virtually identical" to
plaintiff's images and some, even after editing by the defendant,
still contained plaintiffs title or emblem. 9
The court analyzed defendant's actions and found that
they violated three of the exclusive rights granted by the
Copyright Act; reproduction, display and distribution. 60 First, the
court found that the defendant had reproduced plaintiff's images
by copying the images onto its server and downloading them
from the newsgroups. 6' Second, the court found that despite the
fact that the image was only in a digital form on defendant's
servers, the defendant displayed plaintiffs copyrighted images by
having them available to their users to view before
downloading.62 Third, the court found that the defendant had
distributed plaintiff's images when users downloaded the images
from the defendant's web servers. 63 Ultimately, the court held
that defendant had directly infringed upon plaintiff's copyright
registrations. 64

This case is an example of blatant direct copyright
infringement using the Internet. However, most cases are not so
clear. Direct copyright infringement is rare because it is so
obvious, as in the Playboy case where the photos were
reproduced exactly on the defendants web site. The majority of
Id. at 550.
id.
58 Id. at 551.
56
57

'9 Playboy, 991 F. Supp. at 551.

60 Id. (citink 17 U.S.C. § 106). The exclusive rights include the right to
reproduce the work, distribute copies of the work and display the work
publicly. Id.
61Id.
62 Id. at 551-52.
63

1 d. at 551.
64 Playboy, 991 F. Supp. at 553.
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the case law falls within the next category of cases, indirect
copyright infringement, which is broken down into contributory
and vicarious copyright infringement.
B.

Indirect Copyright Infringement and the Internet

Proving cases or enforcing laws against direct copyright
infringement is difficult when the Internet is at issue. This is true
because the parties behind the Internet operation are most often
not actually the infringers. The following cases demonstrate how
frequently "innocent" parties in contributory and vicarious
infringement cases are required to pay for the wrongs of others.
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom Online
Communication Services65 is an example of indirect copyright
infringement. The District Court for the Northern District of
California clearly set forth the law in this area in its decision on a
motion for summary judgment. The defendant, Netcom, was the
operator of a bulletin board service where subscribers to the
service could post messages or files for others to download.6 6 The
messages were not monitored by defendant, but were stored
briefly on the defendant's system. The messages were then copied
to the other server computers.67 The defendant listed terms and
conditions which users were supposed to abide by, and which had
previously been enforced by the defendant.68 One of Netcom's
subscribers posted an infringing message on the bulletin board.6 9
The court found that while the infringing subscriber could be held
directly liable for the act, defendant, as a mere Internet access
provider, could not.70
The fact that a prima facie case for direct copyright
infringement could not be made against Netcom does not mean
that the defendant was clearly innocent under the law: as the
907 F. Supp. at 1375.
66d. at 1367.
65

67 id.
681d.
at

1368.
Id. at 1366.
70 Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1372-73.
69
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court stated, Netcom is not automatically innocent "just because
it did not directly infringe plaintiffs' works; it may still be liable
as a contributory infringer." 71 In Religious Technology, the court
stated "vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the
law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a
species of the broader problem of identifying circumstances in
which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions
of another. 7 2 The court here was able to justify assuming an
arguably innocent party might be liable for another's infringing
activities by analogizing to other areas of law where a cause of
action of contributory infringement is permitted. 73 The court in
Religious Technology found that by posting messages on its
system to be downloaded by other users, the defendant allowed
its subscribers to possibly infringe copyrights. 74 By posting these
messages, defendant was in control of its system.75 This issue of
control is important because in order to succeed, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant had control of the system, and
knowledge of the infringing activities of its users.76
Consequently, on a motion for summary judgment, the court
found that there were genuine issues of fact regarding the control
and knowledge elements which should ultimately be determined
by a jury.77
In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Management,78 the Second Circuit explained the origins and
evolution of contributory and vicarious copyright law.7 9 The
Id. at 1373.
72

Id. (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 435

(1984)).

73 Id.
74 id.
75 Religious Tech.,

907 F. Supp. at 1375 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1963)).
76 See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (defining a contributory infringer as one
who acts "with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.") (emphasis
added).
77 Religious Tech., 907 F. Supp. at 1383.
78 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
79 Id. at 1161-62.
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defendant, Columbia Artists Management, was an organization
that planned concerts, allegedly with the knowledge that the
artists did not have licenses to perform the infringing acts.8 °
Although defendant was not the direct copyright infringer,
defendant was found to have had knowledge, was in a position to
stop the infringement and received a financial benefit from the
performances.81 Satisfying all the elements, the defendant was
found to be liable for vicarious and contributory copyright
infringement.82
The Gershwin court pointed out that vicarious copyright
infringement stems from vicarious liability in respondeat
superior.83 The court discussed the evolution of the interpretation
of contributory copyright infringement law from an early decision
by the Second Circuit in Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co. 84 In
Gross, the Second Circuit held that "one may be liable for
copyright infringement even though he has not himself performed
the protected composition." 85 The Gershwin court held that "one
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes
of another,
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct
86
infringer."
'contributory'
a
as
liable
may be held
In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 87 the United
States Supreme Court used patent law doctrines to eliminate some
8 Id. at 1163.
81 Id.
82 Id.

at 1162.

a Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162.
230 F. 412 (2d Cir. 1916) (holding that all parties involved in
infringement are liable regardless of amount of profits made from infringing
activity).
5 Id. at 414. Although the Gross court refers specifically to performing a
composition, for the purposes of this paper the opinion must be read generally
to mean the performing of any one of the exclusive rights of the copyright
84

holder. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.

Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162. The Gershwin case was decided in 1971,
using the 1968 Supreme Court opinion in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1968), to formulate its interpretation
of contributory copyright infringement.
87 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
86
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of the harshness of contributory infringement. Here, the Court
found Sony not liable for contributory copyright infringement
when Sony manufactured video tape recorders, which could and
were being used to infringe copyrights of material through direct
copying. 88 The Sony Court stated "if vicarious liability is to be
imposed on petitioners in this case, it must rest on the fact that
they have sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact
that their customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized
copies of copyrighted material."89 The Court reasoned that video
tape recorders have many non-infringing uses, therefore it found
that Sony did not have the requisite constructive knowledge
required for a party to be held vicariously liable. 90 The Court
analogized the issue to patent law, applying a modified version of
the "staple article of commerce" doctrine. 91 This doctrine looks
at whether the product has "legitimate" or "commercially
significant" non-infringing uses that may be said to outweigh the
infringing uses.92 Employing this doctrine, the Court held, "the
sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the
product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable
purposes. "93 Finally, relying on the argument that the video tape
recorder's use is "non-commercial time-shifting in the home,"
the Court found that the video tape recorder is capable of
substantial non-infringing uses and therefore Sony's sale of this
item did not constitute contributory copyright infringement. 94

IId. at 456.
89 Id. at 439.
90Id. at 442.
91Id. The staple article of commerce doctrine stems from 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c) which provides in relevant part: "Whoever sells a component of a
patented machine. ...knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be
liable as a contributory infringer." Id. (emphasis added).
92

Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.

93 Id.
94 Id.

at 456.
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In Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc. 95, the Ninth
Circuit applied contributory and vicarious copyright law in its
strictest sense, again shifting the blame from the actual infringing
party to a third party on the theory of control.96 In Fonovisa, the
operators of a flea market were held liable for contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement because vendors at the flea
market were selling infringing musical recordings.97 The
defendant operators received a daily rental fee from independent
vendors to participate in the flea market. 98 According to the
record, it was undisputed that the defendants were aware of the
counterfeit recordings that were infringing upon the rights of
plaintiff. 99 The court found that since the defendants retained the
right to exclude a vendor for any reason, the defendants had the
ability to exclude a vendor for infringement. °° Therefore, the
defendants were liable under a vicarious liability theory.
The Fonovisa court first analyzed the vicarious copyright
infringement claim using a comparison to two types of cases, an
approach used by the Second Circuit in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. H.L. Green Co.'0 ' This approach involved comparing each
case to one of two types of legal situations: a landlord-tenant
situation or a dance hall situation in order to determine liability
for vicarious copyright infringement. 102 The Shapiro court
explained that in landlord-tenant cases, "a landlord ...

lacked

knowledge of the infringing acts of its tenant and.., exercised
no control over the leased premises" and therefore was not liable
for the activities of his tenant. 10 3 As to the "dance hall cases,"
9' 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
6 Id. at 264.
9' Id. at 260-61.
9' Id. at 261.
99 Id.
'00 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261.
101 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).

Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (explaining dance hall cases as those which
involve operator of dance hall or entertainment venue where the infringing
102

performance is performed by the entertainers, yet the dance hall is held liable).
103

Id.
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the operator of such "could control the premises
04
and ...obtained a direct financial benefit from the audience." 1
The Fonovisa court found the facts of the case more similar to the
"dance hall cases" because according to the complaint, the
defendant exercised sufficient control as it had the right to
exclude a vendor for any reason. 10 5 As to the financial benefit,
the court found that the payment of the daily rental fees by the
vendors, plus the direct benefits to the defendants from the
customers, including, but not limited to sales, admission fees and
food, were sufficient to allege direct financial benefit. 106
Therefore, the court held that the plaintiffs
stated a valid claim
07
1
infringement.
for vicarious copyright
The Fonovisa court then considered contributory
copyright infringement and found that the plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged that the defendant operators had knowledge of the
infringing activity as well as material contribution to the
infringing activities. 108 It was undisputed that the defendants were
aware of the infringing materials sold.109 However, the court had
to make a determination as to the material contribution
element." 0 In analyzing this factor, the court looked to the
defendant operators' acts in providing the space, utilities,
parking, etc., and in "striv[ing] to provide the environment and
the market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive."" 1 The court
found these acts by the defendants were sufficient to satisfy the
material contribution requirements11 2 for both vicarious and
contributory copyright infringement.
Contributory copyright infringement was applied broadly
in order to hold those not directly responsible for the

'04 Id.
105Id.
'06

at 262-63 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 307).

Id. at 263.

107Fonovisa, 76

F.3d at 264.

108 Id.

'09 Id. at 261.
" 0 Id. at 264.
Id.
112 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
"'
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infringement liable. Such was the case in Fonovisa.1 13 Originally,
the district court in Fonovisa found that the contribution to
infringement requirement for contributory copyright infringement
should be limited to situations when the defendant "expressly
promoted or encouraged the sale of counterfeit products, or in
some manner protected the identity of the infringers." 114 This
original holding required more of an overt act for liability to
attach. Later, the circuit court in Fonovisa relaxed the
requirement of contribution, thus making it easier to satisfy such
a requirement and holding
more defendants liable in contributory
1 15
copyright infringement.
A consequence of third party liability is that it inhibits
advancements in technology. The Supreme Court in Sony
described intent and purpose of copyright law by quoting from
the Copyright Act of 1909 Judiciary Committee of the House of
Representatives which states:
The enactment of copyright legislation by
Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not
based upon any natural right that the author has in
his writings,... but upon the ground that the
welfare of the public will be served and progress
of science and useful arts will be promoted by
securing to authors for limited periods the
1 16
exclusive rights to their writings.
The law of contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement is against public policy because it hinders
technology. In other words, third party liability punishes those
who create the technological advances others may use for
infringing purposes. Technological advances are important in a
growing society and allowing the law to hinder progress affects
important societal interests. The law of contributory copyright
113

Id.

114

Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1496 (E.D.

Cal. 1994), rev'd, 76 F.3d 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
15 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264.
116 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1909)).
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infringement should require more than mere knowledge, and the
safe harbor provisions should be expanded to protect those
entities making technological advances, without the intent to
infringe on the rights of another.

VI.

A&M RECORDS V. NAPSTER.

7

"The matter before the court concerns the boundary
between sharing and theft, personal use and the unauthorized
worldwide distribution of copyrighted music and sound
recordings."118
The Napster case was one of the most important and
interesting cases involving the Internet in the year 2000. Napster
was one of the first websites of its kind, allowing Internet users to
share music from computer to computer. 19 Napster's software is
an example of a technological advancement that was virtually
eliminated because of copyright law.
Shortly after its inception, Napster offended major
recording artists, record labels and publishing companies, all of
whom were losing money as a result of this convenient new way
to acquire music.12° There was national interest when several
record companies brought suit in an attempt to put an end to
Napster's activities.1 2 1 The following is the sequence of events
which took place in the courts deciding this difficult conflict
between sharing and theft using this innovative new technology.
Napster was a California based company created by a'
college student who produced music-swapping software for
personal use, also making it available, free of charge, for others
to download off the Napster website. 122 The software allows users
to share music files with other users who are logged onto
117A

& M Records v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

..Id. at 900. Chief District Judge Marilyn Hall Patel's opening line of the
opinion. Id.
"9 Napster, 2000 WL 573136 at *1.
'20 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
121 d.
22
' Id. 901-02.
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Napster's system at the same time. 123 The software provided by
Napster enables users to read a list of songs available for
downloading by other users.' 24 Users can also find the music they
want by entering the name of the song or artist and the software
will assist in finding it.' 25 The user can then download the
selected file by clicking a button, causing the Napster server to
communicate with the computer storing the music and initiate the
download.' 26

On December 6, 1999, the plaintiffs, a group consisting of
A&M Records, along with seventeen other record labels, filed
suit for contributory and vicarious federal copyright infringement
and other state law claims. 27 Although the original complaint
128 the court
was against Napster and its CEO, Eileen Richardson,
129
eventually dismissed all claims against Richardson.
Napster first moved for summary judgment on May 12,
2000, claiming protection under the safe harbor provision of the
DMCA, at section 512(a). 130 Napster, as a service provider,
would be able to claim protection only if the five statutory
conditions were met.' 3 ' As a threshold issue, Napster had to
qualify as a "service provider" under the statute before it could
claim the safe harbor protection. 32 The Napster court stated that
the "plaintiffs appear to concede that Napster is a 'service
provider' within the meaning of [the statute]," therefore Napster
only needed to satisfy the remaining five conditions to qualify for
protection under the safe harbor provision.133
123 Napster, 2000 WL 573136 at *1.
124

Id.

125 id.
126

127

Id.

Id. This article will limit the discussion of the case to the federal

copyright questions.
128 Napster, 2000 WL 573136 at *1.
129

Id.

Id.; see supra discussion at Part IV: Digital Millenium Copyright Act.
U.S.C. § 512(a).
132 Napster, 2000 WL 573136 at *3 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)).

130

131 17
133

Id. at *3; see supra discussion at Part IV: Digital Millenium Copyright

Act.
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DMCA Safe Harbor

The court analyzed each of the five conditions in
section 512(a)'s safe harbor provision to determine whether
Napster qualified for protection.13 4 Napster argued that it
satisfied each of the conditions because its users initiated the
transmission of MP3 files. 35 In addition, because Napster did not
edit any input, select the users, make any copies of the 36
material,
or modify the material, the conditions were all satisfied. 1
However, the plaintiffs argued that Napster's functions
went beyond those listed in the statute. 137 They argued that these
other functions must be analyzed separately under section
512(n). 138 The other functions that the plaintiffs referred to were
Napster's providing a search engine, directory, index and
links. 139 The plaintiffs argued "these functions are covered by the
more stringent eligibility requirements of §512(d) rather than
§512(a)." 40 Section 512(d), titled "Information Location Tools,"
provides protection for Internet service providers that use
"information location tools, including a directory, index,
reference, pointer, or hypertext link, if the provider [meets three
additional conditions]." '4'
134

Id. at *4; see supra discussion at Part IV: Digital Millenium Copyright

Act.

MP3 files are audio recordings stored in a digital format, which can be
copied onto a hard drive from an audio CD. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
136 Napster, 2000 WL 573136 at *4; see supra discussion at Part IV: Digital
Millenium
Copyright Act.
13 7 Id.
138 Id.
135

139 id.
'40 Npster, 2000 WL 573136 at *4. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) is the safe harbor
provision for Internet service providers with five conditions to be satisfied
while section 512(d) is a safe harbor provision which contains five conditions
that a service provider must satisfy if it supplies information location tools.
The section 512(d) conditions are more stringent according to the plaintiffs. 17
U.S.C. § 512(a) and (d). See supra discussion at Part IV: Digital Millenium
Copyright Act.
17 U.S.C. § 512(d); see supra discussion at Part IV: Digital Millenium
Copyright Act.
'41
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In response to the first argument, the court held, "finding
some aspects of the system outside the scope of subsection 512(a)
would not preclude a ruling that other aspects do meet 512(a)
criteria." 142 Therefore, the court held that these functions must
also be analyzed under 512(d). 3 Since it was deciding a motion
for summary judgment brought by Napster, the court did not need
to rule on the applicability of section 512(d) since this was not
part of Napster's original argument. 144 However, the court
further commented, "the applicability of subsection 512(d) does
use of the 512(a) safe harbor as an
not completely foreclose
45
affirmative defense." 1
The plaintiffs further argued that Napster did not satisfy
the fourth condition of the section 512(a) safe harbor provision
because the MP3 files are stored on Napster's system for longer
than the duration of the transmission. 146 The court looked at the
plain language of the statute as well as the legislative history and
determined that the transmission "goes from one part of the
system to another ... but not 'through' the system," therefore
finding that Napster did not meet the requirements of the safe
harbor provision.1 4 7 Consequently, the court held that "§512(a)
files," and summary
did not protect the transmission of MP3
48
judgment for Napster must be denied.
The court gave an additional reason for denying the
defendant's motion for summary judgment in that there were
genuine questions of fact regarding whether or not the defendant
had fulfilled the additional safe harbor eligibility requirement
found in section 512(i). 149 This section of the statute states that a
service provider will be protected by the safe harbor provisions
only if the provider "has adopted and reasonably
142

Napster, 2000 WL 573136 at *6.

143 Id.
144

Id.

145 Id.

146 Id.
147 Napster, 2000

WL 573136 at *7-*8.

Id.
149 Id. at *9.
148
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providing for punishment in the

form of termination of that user account when there is repeated
infringement taking place.' 5 ' The court found there were genuine
issues of material fact as to whether Napster had implemented
and enforced such a policy.15 2 The court noted that Napster had a
policy. 15 3 However, Napster created this policy after litigation
began in order to comply with the statute. 54
B.

Fair Use Defense

On July 26, 2000, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent Napster from continuing its activities.' 55
The court found that there was a strong likelihood of success for
the plaintiffs, reasoning that direct infringement by Napster users
would establish contributory and/or vicarious liability on Napster
itself.' 56 The court found that Napster users directly infringed by
downloading copyrighted music. 157 Napster raised the affirmative
defense of "fair use" in opposition of the injunction. 58 Fair use
as a statutory defense has four factors which must be balanced by
the court: 159

(1) The purpose and character of the use including
whether it is of a commercial nature;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the60 potential market for
value of the copyrighted work. 1
"0 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1).
. Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
"' Napster, 2000 WL 573136 at *10.
'13
Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918.
114Napster, 2000 WL 573136 at *4.
'55
A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1009483 (N.D. Cal 2000).
156
Id. at *I.
157
id.

158 Id.at *1.
"9 17 U.S.C. § 107.
160id.
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The burden was on Napster to show that its activities
constituted fair use.161 Despite Napster's claim of fair use of
sampling, space shifting and authorized distribution, the court
found that Napster's non-infringing uses of the copyrighted
materials were minimal. 162 The court implied the fair use
argument that Napster used was a theory developed after
litigation began rather than the reality. 163 Of those factors, those
most disputed were "the nature of the copyrighted work" and
"the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole." '64 As to the second factor, the
nature of the copyrighted work, the court explained that the
works in question were musical compositions for which
copyrights are normally obtained. 165 As to the third factor, the
amount and substantiality of the portion used, the whole musical
composition was downloaded. 166 In evaluating the fourth factor,
harm to the market, the court found that the use of the Napster
website harmed the market in two ways. First, Napster users
were obtaining music for free when they would normally have
had to pay for it. Second, Napster was hindering plaintiffs'
167
ability to enter the market of digital music downloading.
Balancing these factors, the court found that Napster's use did not
68
qualify as fair use. 1
The court granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining
Napster from "causing or assisting or enabling or facilitating or
contributing to the copying, duplicating or otherwise other
infringement upon all copyrighted ...
material in which
69
1
rights."
...
or
copyright
a
hold
plaintiffs

161
162

Napster, 2000 WL 1009483 at *2.
Id.

163 Id.

164
id.
165

id.

'66 Napster, 2000 WL 1009483 at *2.
167 id.

id.
169 Id. at *8.
168
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Contributory and Vicarious Liability

On August 10, 2000, the court heard a joint motion for a
preliminary injunction brought by both the record companies and
the music publishers to preclude Napster from "engaging in or
assisting others in copying, downloading, uploading,
transmitting, or distributing copyrighted music without the
express permission of the rights owner." 70 Again the court
rejected Napster's argument to expand the fair use doctrine to
allow Napster users to download MP3 files. 17 Moreover,
Napster argued that the infringement was by third party users and
plaintiffs did not show probable success on the merits of the
claims for contributory and vicarious infringement pending
against Napster. 172 Napster claimed that the owners of the
73
copyrighted music were not harmed by Napster's operation.
The court rejected Napster's arguments, and granted the
74
plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction. 1
For the plaintiffs to succeed on the claims of contributory

or vicarious copyright infringement they had to demonstrate that
Napster facilitated direct copyright infringement by a third

party. 75 The court found that the plaintiffs not only succeeded in
demonstrating this, but additionally "established a prima facie
case of direct copyright infringement" by Napster users. 176 In
making this determination, the court found that eighty-seven
percent of the music files downloaded or uploaded by Napster
users were copyrighted and that more than seventy percent of the
copyrights were owned or administered by the plaintiffs in the
77
action.'
Once direct copyright infringement by Napster users was
established, the plaintiffs had to establish their claims for
170 Napster,

171
Id. at

114 F. Supp. 2d at 900.

900-01.

2
17
Id.at 901.
173id.
174id.
'.Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911.

176
Id.
177

id.
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contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. 178 The two
requirements of contributory infringement, as set forth in
Gershwin, are knowledge 179 and inducement, cause or material
80
contribution to the conduct of another.'
The knowledge requirement in the definition refers to that
which the defendant has reason to know of, and not actual
knowledge of the action. 18 The court found that Napster had at
least constructive knowledge of its users' infringement.1 8 2 In
other words, the court found that Napster had reason to know of
the copyright infringement of its users.18 3 As to the second
element, the court found that Napster materially contributed to
the copyright infringement of its users because without the
services of Napster, users would not be able to locate and
download the copyrighted music.' 8 4 Therefore, the court found
that there was a reasonable likelihood5 of success on the claim of
18
contributory copyright infringement.
The court then considered the likelihood of success of the
claim for vicarious copyright infringement.1 8 6 Vicarious copyright
infringement requires the defendant to have "the right and ability
to supervise the infringing activity and also ha[ve] a direct
financial interest in such activities." 8 7 The court distinguished
between these two elements of vicarious copyright
infringement.18 8 As to the first element, plaintiffs successfully
showed that Napster can supervise the conduct of its users,

171 Id.
179 Id.

at 918.
at 912.
0 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
11 Id.at 918 (citing Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Networks Prods.,
902 F.2d 829, 846 (11th Cir. 1990); Sega Enter. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp.
923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
182 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d. at 920.
183 Id.
184

id.

185 Id.
186

Id.

17

Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262).

188 Id.
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although such supervision is difficult.' 89 Regarding the second
element, the plaintiffs argued that financial interest does not
require actual revenue generated from the activity. 190 They relied
on prior cases that interpreted 'financial interest' as being mere
economic incentive in the infringing activities.191 The court
recognized that Napster did not earn revenue in its operations
while also recognizing that Napster expected to eventually earn
92
revenue by offering more music and increasing its user base.
With both elements satisfied, the court found that there was a
reasonable likelihood of
success on the claim of vicarious
93
copyright infringement. 1
The preliminary injunction issued by the court did not shut
down Napster's website. 94 It did, however, leave Napster with a
heavy burden.195 The court ordered Napster to develop the means
to ensure that any copyrighted music owned by the plaintiffs was
not copied by Napster users. 196 In order to achieve that, Napster
was ordered to work directly with the plaintiffs in identifying
which works were owned by the plaintiffs. 197
Napster appealed the injunction on February 12, 2001.198
The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 199
Although the court of appeals agreed with issuing a preliminary
injunction, it held that the injunction was too broad and needed to
be modified. 200 The court found that contributory liability may be
imposed if Napster "(1) receives reasonable knowledge of
18 9 Id. at 920-21.

'90 Id. at 921.
191 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 921 (citing Major Bob Music v. Stubbs, 851
F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ga. 1994); Walden Music v. C.H.W., Inc., 1996 WL
254654, at *5 (D. Kan. 1996); Broadcast Music v. Hobi, Inc., 1993 WL
404152, at *3 (M.D. La. 1993)).
192

id.

193id.
194

Id. at 927.

195
Id.

196 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
197
Id.

198 A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
'99 Id. at 1029.
2oo

Id. at 1027.
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specific infringing files with copyrighted musical compositions
and sound recordings; (2) knows or should know that such files
are available on the Napster system;
and (3) fails to act to prevent
201
works."
the
of
distribution
viral
Employing the Sony Court's reasoning, the circuit court
refused to impute the knowledge to Napster simply because
Napster created the system which facilitated infringement.20 2
Rather, the court pointedly distinguished between Napster's
system and Napster's conduct.20 3 The court held that to rest its
decision of contributory liability on the existence of knowledge
just from allowing the infringing use to take place would violate
the holding of Sony. 204 However, the court of appeals agreed with
the lower court's assessment that Napster had actual knowledge
of the direct infringement of its users and still failed to remove
the offensive material. Therefore, the court of appeals held that
Napster was nevertheless liable.20 5
The court of appeals determined that the injunction was
too broad because it required Napster alone to ensure that its
system was not used to copy, download, upload, transmit, or
distribute any of plaintiffs' music. 20 6 This court held that
plaintiffs be required to provide notice to Napster of the
copyrighted works on its system before Napster should have to
act to prevent access to such works.20 7 The injunction also stated
that Napster would have to monitor its system to stop copyright
infringement from occurring.20 8 The court of appeals recognized
that enforcing this part of the injunction would be extremely
difficult, since monitoring a system such as Napster, where the
copyrighted material may be renamed by the Napster user, may

Id.
Id. at 1020-21 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).
203 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020.
2
4Id. at 1021.
201
202

205

Id. at 1020.

Id. at 1027.
Id.
20 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
206
207
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be complicated. 2 0 9 The court of appeals also advised the district
court on remand to issue the injunction with the Napster system
in mind, specifically because the system "does not
currently
21 0
appear to allow Napster access to users' MP3 files."
D.

The Final Result

The Napster case was remanded and the district court
issued its opinion on March 5, 2001, amending the injunction in
accordance with the decision of the court of appeals.211 Finally,
on September 24, 2001, Napster settled with the music publishers
for $26 million for past copyright infringement plus $10 million
as an advance for future licensing royalties.212 The remaining
plaintiffs will probably also settle with Napster in the near future
as the judge issued a stern warning that no additional papers be
filed against this defendant.213
It is noteworthy that both the music producers (the
copyright holders) as well as Napster appealed the modified
preliminary injunction.214 The plaintiffs argued that although the
district court was carefully monitoring Napster's compliance with
the modified preliminary injunction, the court determined that
Napster failed to become compliant under the terms of the
2 15 The plaintiffs argued that Napster was obligated to
injunction. 21
block all files containing any protected 2 16works not just those
works that the plaintiffs alerted Napster to.
Napster cross appealed arguing that any requirement that
they police their system was both vague and failed to conform to
2

9 Napster, 239

210
21'

F.3d at 1027.

Id. at 1028.
A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 2001 WL 227083 (N.D. Cal. 2001).

The same opinion was issued with regards to the actions by Metallica and Jerry
Leiber. See Metallica v. Napster, Inc., 2001 WL 777005 (N.D. Cal. 2001);
Leiber v. Napster, Inc., 2001 WL 789461 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
212 Napster Reaches Settlement With Music Publishers, 3-1 ANDREWs E-Bus.
L. BuLL., Nov. 2001, at 4.
213 Joel Mowbray, NapsterNo More, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 1, 2001, at A19.
214 A & M Records v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002).
2'ld. at 1095-96.
21
6Id.at 1096.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss4/9

28

Pignataro: Copyright Law and the Internet

2002

COPYRIGHT LAWAND THE
INTERNET

811

the fair notice required of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(d).217

The court rejected this argument stating that the

standard to set aside injunctions under Rule 65 requires an
injunction to be so vague that it has no reasonable specific
meaning.218 In addition, the court held that Napster had a duty to
police its system to prevent any further vicarious copyright
infringement.2"9
The court's decision in this case effectively affirmed the
district court's preliminary injunction and moreover affirmed the
shut down order entered by the district court.220 In essence this
decision was fatal to Napster as the court placed the responsibility
of locating the offending material on the defendant.
The final Napster decision, modifying the preliminary
injunction, is an example of why third party liability must be
limited by requiring more than mere knowledge that someone else
is infringing on a copyright or that the possibility exists that
others may have the ability to control the infringing action of
another. The overwhelming task of preventing third party
infringing may inhibit numerous technological advances such as
the Napster system. This is contrary to a public policy that
otherwise seeks to encourage technological advancement. In
order to avoid this inhibition of technology, third party liability
should require some overt act such as promotion of the
217 FED.

R. CIv. PRoc. 65(d) provides for the form and scope of an

injunction or restraining order.
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining
order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be
specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not
by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or
acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the
parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active
concert or participation with them who receive actual notice
of the order by personal service or otherwise.
Id.
2" 8 Napster, 284 F.3d at 1097.
21
9ida
20 Id. at

1099.
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infringement or encouragement of the infringement before
liability attaches. The court of appeals decision modifying the
preliminary injunction is an example of the judiciary moving in
the direction of limiting third party liability. If systems such as
Napster were to actively implement a policy against infringement
and actively monitor to the best of its ability using current
technology a system to avoid infringement, the courts may hold
for defendants in future cases.
VII.

THE DMCA AFTER NAPSTER

The Fourth Circuit decided the case of ALS Scan v.
RemarQ Communities, Inc. 221 on February 6, 2001. ALS Scan
involves another interpretation of the DMCA.222 Plaintiff, ALS
Scan, creates and markets adult photographs that are displayed on
the Internet to its paying subscribers and sold on videotapes and
CD ROMs. 223 Defendant, RemarQ, is an Internet service
provider that offers over 30,000 newsgroups on different
topics.224 Users are able to post articles that remain on the
newsgroup for eight to ten days. 225 The defendant has the ability
to monitor these newsgroups, although it does not do so. 226 Two
of the newsgroups contained hundreds of plaintiffs copyrighted
images and were even named after ALS Scan.227 Plaintiff sent a
letter to RemarQ notifying it of the infringement and demanding
that RemarQ cease the infringing activity.228 The defendant
refused to comply, stating that it would only eliminate those items
identified by the plaintiff as infringing. 229 DMCA claims were
brought before the United States District Court for the District of

221

239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001).

222

Id.

223

Id. at 620.

224

Id.

225

id.

226

ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 620.

227

Id.
Id.

228

229Id.

lat621.
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Maryland. 230 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of RemarQ finding that ALS Scan failed to meet the notice
requirement of section 512(c) of the DMCA. 231 ALS Scan
appealed the district court's decision.232
ALS Scan argued that it complied with the notification
requirement of the Act and therefore RemarQ could not claim
protection under the safe harbor provision.233 Knowledge on the
part of the infringing party is a requirement for liability under the
DMCA.2 34 To meet this requirement, the copyright holder must
provide proper notice to the service provider of the infringing
acts.2 3 5 RemarQ argued that because ALS Scan did not identify
the infringing works, RemarQ did not have notice "as a matter of
law. , 236 RemarQ further claimed that since it did not have actual
knowledge, it was protected by the safe harbor provision. 237 The
court analyzed RemarQ's conduct under the applicable safe
harbor provision entitled "Information residing on systems or
networks at direction of users. " 238 The safe harbor provides
protection to service providers:
For infringement of copyright by reason of the
storage at the direction of a user of material that
resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider, if the
service provider - (A)(i) does not have actual
knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
20

'3

Id. at 622.

231 ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 624.
232

Id. There was a discussion by the Fourth Circuit on whether the district

court granted summary judgment or a motion to dismiss but the discussion was
found irrelevant. However, the Fourth Circuit refers to the district court's
decision, using both summary judgment and motion to dismiss throughout the
opinion. Id.
233 Id. at 622 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)).
234 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A).
235 Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)-(B).
236 ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 622.
237

Id.

231

Id. at 623 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)).
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(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not
aware of facts or circumstances from which
infringing activity is apparent; or (iii) upon
obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the
material; 239
In order to evaluate the removal of the material upon
notice the court had to determine whether ALS Scan had
complied with the notice requirement found in §512(c)(3)(A). 24 °
This section of the statute contains six requirements for
notification of which the district court found that ALS Scan had
complied with all but two of them. 24 1 RemarQ claimed that ALS
did not give a representative list of the infringing pictures and it
did not identify the pictures with sufficient detail so that RemarQ
could locate them.242
The court looked to the legislative history of the
enactment of the DMCA finding that the act "requires that a
copyright owner put the service provider on notice in a detailed
manner but allows notice by means that comport with the
prescribed format only 'substantially,' rather than perfectly." 243
The court further cited to the DMCA at section 512(c)(3)(A)(ii)
saying that the list only has to be "representative" and section
512(c)(3)(A)(iii), the owner only has to give information
"reasonably sufficient" to help locate the infringing material. 2 "
The court reasoned that this type of language relaxed the standard
of notification when referring to works of this type and therefore
239
240
241

17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. Section 512(c)(3)(A) lists the following six requirements for proper

notice: (1) signature of owner; (2) identification of work claimed to have been
infringed; (3) information sufficient for service provider to locate material
being infringed; (4) contact information for the complaining party; (5)
statement of good faith belief of the infringement by the complaining party;
and (6) statement that the information in the notice is accurate under penalty of
perjury.
Id.
242
243

ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 624.
Id. at 625.

244id.
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the letter in this case was sufficient notification.245 The grant of
summary judgment in favor of RemarQ was reversed.246
One of the more recent cases involving the DMCA,
CoStar Group v. Loopnet, Inc.,247 was decided on September 28,
2001. The plaintiff, CoStar is a national commercial real estate
information provider that has copyrighted its database of
commercial real estate, including pictures of the real estate. 24 8 It
subsequently grants licenses to those seeking to use the
database. 24 9 The defendant, LoopNet, is an Internet company that
allows its users to post listings of leases available for commercial
real estate.25 ° Photographs may also be posted after they are
uploaded into LoopNet's system so that LoopNet may verify the
property and picture.25 1 There is no fee for this service.252
Plaintiff brought a copyright infringement action against LoopNet
for direct and contributory copyright infringement, claiming that
over 300 photographs copyrighted by CoStar were listed on
defendant's website.253
The court used the interpretation of the DMCA definition
of online service provider from prior cases. 254 The court found
that LoopNet might fall within the broad definition of an online
service provider used by earlier courts.255 The court pointed out
that if the defendant met the threshold requirement of qualifying
as a service provider, it may be entitled to safe harbor protection
unless it had knowledge of the infringement. 256 The court found
that even though the photographs were uploaded onto LoopNet's
245

id.

246

Id. at 620.

247

164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001).

248

Id. at 691-92.

249

id.

250

Id.

251

Id.

252 CoStar, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
253

254

Id.
Id. at 701 (citing ALS Scan, 239 F.3d at 619 and Hendrickson v. eBay,

Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).
255 CoStar, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
256

Id. at 702.
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system and reviewed before posting, LoopNet might still be
protected because it did not have knowledge of the
infringement.257
In order to remain protected by the safe harbor provision,
a service provider must respond immediately to correct the
situation to the best of its ability after notice of the possible
copyright infringement. 258 The court found that there were
questions of fact concerning the response to the notice, although
the court did recognize that LoopNet established copyright
policies. 259 The court applied the safe harbor analysis and
concluded that LoopNet may be protected. 260 The motions for
summary judgment by CoStar relating to safe harbor protection
and contributory copyright infringement were denied and
LoopNet's motion for summary judgment on the claim of direct
copyright infringement was granted.261
The CoStar ruling is inconsistent with Napster. In
CoStar, the photographs were actually uploaded into LoopNet's
system and reviewed, yet the court still found that LoopNet
would be protected. The ability to control the photos through the
ISP's system would defeat protection under the safe harbor
provision. In CoStar, the court acknowledged this, yet stated that
because LoopNet's only form of control is blocking users to the
site, this system of review may be enough to stay within the safe
harbor protection. 262 Napster's actions would seem to qualify
more clearly under the safe harbor provision than LoopNet's
since Napster did not hold any of the music on its system and did
not have the ability to monitor what music was being shared.2 63
Whether or not an Internet company can monitor what its
users are doing depends on available technology. The law is not
257 id.

258

Id. at 703.

259 Id. at 704.
260 CoStar, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
261

262

Id.
Id. at 704.

Napster, 2000 WL 1009483 at *6. The court justifies the inference that
Napster has the ability to monitor by comparing it to its ability to create this
software in the first place.
263
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firm in this area, therefore decisions will depend on the court, the
times, and the specific facts of each case. Again, the court in
LoopNet relaxed the standards required by the statute by inferring
that LoopNet would fit within the statute as an online service
provider affording LoopNet the additional protection of the safe
harbor provision. If Napster, or a similar system were to be
decided on the merits, using the more relaxed reasoning of recent
decisions, the outcome may not be unfavorable to the internet
service.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The public debate over possible outcomes of Napster
seems unbelievable considering the earlier case law in this area.
By analyzing the copyright infringement case law that developed
over the years, even before the arrival of the Internet the outcome
of Napster seems obvious. Punishing the service provider or the
person who created the mechanism that is facilitating the
copyright infringement is not effective. New developments
facilitate normally questionable activities in all areas of life
everyday, but those developing the means cannot be held liable
for their mere ingenuity. A change is necessary for law and law
enforcement on the Internet.
Until the proper parties are held accountable for their
actions, copyright infringement on the Internet will continue.
While individual users are at home using the Internet, it is easy to
feel like no one is watching. Someone should be watching. Those
being held liable for contributory copyright infringement should
develop a way to better monitor their own systems in order to
avoid liability. If monitoring is performed effectively, copyright
infringement on the Internet may become a thing of the past.
One possible solution to the problem of enforcing,
copyright laws on the Internet is to create a monitoring system
with the capacity to monitor the Internet more completely. This
type of system could trace copyright infringement, or prevent
copyright infringement altogether. With a system to trace
copyright infringement, the actual infringing party can be held
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liable, rather than an innocent third party. The ISPs and Napsters
of the Internet should not be punished for the acts of the actual
infringing parties.
In the mean time, the legislature should deal with the
hindering effect third party infringement laws have on
technological advances. Specifically, the safe harbor provisions,
which currently protect some parties from liability should be
expanded to include those parties making technological advances
that may be utilized by those who infringe directly. In this
author's opinion, the expansion of the safe harbor was not
intended to protect those assisting copyright infringement with
full knowledge of the infringement. Rather, it was expanded to
protect those parties who have made advancements in technology
whose advancements are being employed by third parties to
infringe on the copyrights of others. In addition, the courts can
narrow their interpretation of contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement. By doing this, the courts would be
limiting the broad liability now imposed on third parties in
Internet cases. In some cases, as we saw through discussion of
the case law, courts appear to be moving in this direction, making
such limitations.
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